Taxation—Assessment Review Proceedings by Stenger, John
Buffalo Law Review 
Volume 6 Number 2 Article 61 
1-1-1957 
Taxation—Assessment Review Proceedings 
John Stenger 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview 
 Part of the Taxation-State and Local Commons 
Recommended Citation 
John Stenger, Taxation—Assessment Review Proceedings, 6 Buff. L. Rev. 219 (1957). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol6/iss2/61 
This The Court of Appeals Term is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital 
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an 
authorized editor of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact 
lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
COURT OF APPEALS, 1955 -TERM
sumption disappears. 7 The problem then in the instant case was for the plain-
tiff to come forward with proof. At the trial the tax collector testified that
he posted a notice in only one place but that. he saw- the other five notices
posted,'which he thought had been posted by the 'postmaster- He was not
able to produce a copy of the notice posted, but only one which was similar
to the statements being used at that time and which did not contain provisions
for the iequisite number of collection days. This was -evidence of habit from
which it might be inferred that the actual posters used were also lacking in
the requisite statements. In both instances the Court held that the plaintiff
presented enough evidence to prove lack of substantial compliance with the
statutory requirements by the tax collector.
The trial court through an official referee as fact finder, and the Appellate
Divisions -and three dissenting judges of the Court of Appeals, upholding
the referee's findings as supported by the evidence, found that the plaintiff
failed to prove his allegations. In reversing the findings of the referee,
the majority must have found a compelling case for the plaintiff. One reason
might be that as part of the basis of their decisions, the lower courts held
the action barred by application of the wrong statute of limitations.9 In addi-
tion to this, there is a strong statutory policy against forfeiture of title in tax
sale proceedings'0 and here the plaintiff was a victim of circumstances since
he had no notice of the tax sale until the period for redemption had run."
This decision seems to be an attempt to resolve a conflict, of policies,
holding the policy against forfeiture of title stronger to that of the presumption
of regularity and resultant stability of title in tax proceedings. In any event
it serves as notice to tax officials to strictly comply with statutory proceedures.
Assessment Review Proceedings
Under the Tax Law, section 292-b, as amended last year,
12 tax assess-
7. People ex rel Wallington Apts. v. Miller, 288 N. Y. 31, 41 N. E. 2d 445
(1942).
8. Werking v. Amity Estates, 1 A. D. 2d 731, 147 N. Y. S. 2d 474 (3d Dep't
1955).
9. N. Y. TAx LAw §37 allows a period of three years after the tax sale for
redemption by an owner-occupant who has not been given notice of the sale by
the grantee. However this was not an action for redemption but rather one
aimed at avoiding the tax sale by reason of jurisdictional defects and so the
Court held this three year limitation inapplicable. Instead, the two year limita-
tion from the date of record in section 131 applies. See note 6 supra.
10. MCKINNEY'S STATUTES §313. Where it is sought to divest one's title to
property through tax sale proceedings, the statute must be strictly pursued.
Every requisite of the statute having a semblance of benefit to the owner must
be substantially complied with. In such a case, the statute is construed strongly
against forfeiture of title and in favor of the retention of title by the owner
and of a right to redeem.
11. See note 9 supra.
12. N. Y. Sess. Laws 1955, c. 651, §1.
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ment review proceedings upon petition and notice are deemed abandoned
unless brought to hearing within four years from the date of commencement.
Prior to the 1955 amendment, the statute contained a clause expressly limiting
its operation to proceedings in counties having a population of less than
.one hundred thousand.I 3
Cahen v. Boyland'4 raised the issue of whether the amended statute
controlled proceedings brought in New York City. Plaintiff, an owner of
real property in New York City, had pending four separate proceedings to
review tax assessments levied against her property by the defendants, the
first of which proceedings had been commenced more than four years before.
Plaintiff contended that the amended statute did not extend to such pro-
ceedings because it referred only to proceedings commenced upon petition
and notice, whereas proceedings in New York City are commenced according
to separate procedure requiring service of the petition alone.1
The Court sustained plaintiff's contention, holding that the amendment,
deleting the population restriction of the statute's coverage, had the effect of
extending the reach of the provision to all counties in the state except those
contained within New York City. Reversing the judgments below,1' the court
rejected defendant's suggestion that the legislature's reference to the "petition
and notice" was mere surplusage or that its failure to specify the other type of
proceeding was inadvertent. In construing the legislation, the court looked
to the statute as a whole, and applied the principles of giving effect, whenever
practicable, to all the language employed,17 and of presuming that each clause
has a purpose.18 It was pointed out that the differentiation in procedure be-
tween- proceedings commenced by "petition and notice" elsewhere in the
state, and those commenced by "petition alone" in New York City, is explicitly
and sharply written into section 290-b of the Tax Law, and is expressly pre-
served in three other sections.' 9 The Court concluded that the words "petition"
and "petition and notice" must be regarded as words of art, and asserted that:
[T]he only purpose that could have been served by referring to the
'proceeding upon petition and notice' was to exclude the 'petition alone' pro-
ceedings of New York City."2°
13. N. Y. Sess. Laws 1949, c. 551, §7, (renumbered, N. Y. Sess. Laws 1950, c.
655, §1).
14. 1 N. Y. 2d 8, 132 N. E. 2d 890 (1956).
15. N. Y. TAX LAW §290-b; ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF CITY OF NEW YORK
§166-1.0.
16. Cahen v. Boyland, 208 Misc. 779, 143 N. Y. S. 2d 909 (Sup. Ct. 1955);
arf'd mem., 286 App. Div. 1076, 146 N. Y. S. 2d 666 (1st Dep't 1955).
17. Heerwagen v. Crosstown St. Py. Co., 179 N. Y. 99, 105, 71 N. E. 729,
731 (1904).
18. Crayton v. Larabee, 220 N. Y. 493, 501, 116 N. E. 355 (1917).
19. N. Y. TAX LAw §§291, 293, 294; see also, SIXTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF'
N. Y. JUDICIAL COUNCIL, 1950, p. 18.
20. 1 N. Y. 2d at 14, 132 N. E. 2d at 892, 893.
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Thus, New York City property owners petitioning for review of tax
assessments are not subject to the four year limitation within which to bring
their proceeding to hearing, as are their brethren elsewhere in the state. It is
the opinion of this writer that such a result is not to be desired. The statutory
section in question is in the nature of a statute of limitations, providing as it
does that proceedings thus deemed abandoned shall be dismissed and the
order of dismissal shall constitute a final adjudication of all issues raised in the
proceeding. Therefore, it appears to be inequitable to allow certain property
owners to escape such effects solely because of their geographical location,
and, furthermore, it appears that the statute would be most efficacious in the
New York City area where a large amount of such litigation is likely to arise.
Therefore, conceding the decision in the instant case to be legally sound,
it is submitted that the legislature should further amend the statute to give
it unquestionable state-wide effect.
Stafute of Limitaions-Tax Lien Foreclosures
The question of the best method for dealing with foreclosures of de-
linquent taxes is within the discretion of the legislature. 2 1 The efficient admin-
istration of taxes may necessitate providing different periods of limitations for
the duration of a tax lien for one area than may be suitable for another area.
2 2
There is specific provision in the Civil Practice Act to encompass the problem
of statutorily imposed limitations, for the Act provides that the general
sections of the Act shall controll unless a different limitation is set up by
law.2 3 And when the legislative will is declared, as in the establishment of a
statutory limitation, the courts, in judicially construing it, should give full
meaning to the legislative enactment - neither limiting nor extending the
plain language of the statute.
24
In L. K. Land Corporation v. Gordon,- 5 the Court, in construing section
172 of the New York City Charter which provided that all taxes shall become
liens on real estate and "shall remain such liens until paid" held that it meant
exactly what it said - an action to foreclose a lien may be brought at any
time; the existence of the lien is perpetual. The general limitation periods
21. Of. Gauthier v. Ditman, 204 N. Y. 20, 97 N. E. 464 (1912).
22. Cahen v. Boyland, 1 N. Y. 2d 8, 132 N. E. 2d 88 (1956).
23. N. Y. Civ. PRAC. Acr §10.
24. Matter of Trustees of N. Y. & Brooklyn Bridges,. 72 N. Y. 527 (1878).
25. 1 N. Y. 2d 465, 136 N. E. 2d 500 (1956). Suit was instituted eight years
after accrual of the cause of action to a plaintiff who purchased the liens from
the city pursuant to section 415 (1)-23.0 of the ADMINISTRATION CODE OF TH CITY
OF NEw YORK.
